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BROADBAND ROUTER SECURITY: HISTORY, 
CHALLENGES AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
Patryk Szewczyk and Rose Macdonald 
Edith Cowan University, Western Australia 
ABSTRACT 
Consumer grade broadband routers are integral to accessing the Internet and are primarily 
responsible for the reliable routing of data between networks. Despite the importance of 
broadband routers, security has never been at the forefront of their evolution. Consumers are 
often in possession of broadband routers that are rich in consumer-orientated features yet riddled 
with vulnerabilities that make the routers susceptible to exploitation. This amalgamation of 
theoretical research examines consumer grade broadband routers from the perspective of how they 
evolved, what makes them vulnerable, how they are targeted, and the challenges concerning the 
application of security. The research further explores the Australian roll out of a joint ISP; 
consumer extended public Wi-Fi network (Air), in which routers play crucial roles. The security 
of these networks is considered, and questions are explored, regarding consumer legal risks, 
particularly for consumers who opt-in to extend this service. This research paper concludes with 
recommendations for the development and introduction of Australian router security deployment 
standards. 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Australia is consistently identified as a major 
Internet user that will continue to be targeted 
by cybercrime. Some protection is afforded by 
specialised security software for computers. 
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) 
routers can complement specialised security 
software in counteracting the severity of 
cybercriminal activity. For the ADSL router to 
provide a layer of security, it requires adequate 
and an appropriate selection of security 
mechanisms and controls. The ADSL router 
typically operates in a discreet, reliable manner 
within Small office Home office (SoHo) 
environments - typically forgotten once the 
initial configuration phase passes. However, 
there is continual increase in research evidence 
depicting cyber-attacks specifically targeting or 
exploiting vulnerabilities within ADSL routers. 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
Rumours further indicate that known 
vulnerabilities within ADSL routers may 
purposefully go unaddressed, allowing specific 
organisations remote access to a target 
network ( Greenberg, 2017). The ongoing cyber-
attacks demonstrate the need to protect an 
ADSL router correctly - using best practices 
and standards. 
ADSL routers (also known as 'broadband 
routers ,' but referred to hereafter as just 
'routers') are essential in providing reliable 
network connectivity between computers, 
printers, tablets, the Internet of Things (IoT), 
and the Internet. The connections form 
networks, which may be small local networks, 
or larger external networks linking thousands 
of devices across vast areas. The required 
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network topology, scale, and purpose dictate 
the type or category of router hardware chosen 
to establish the connections. While enterprise 
grade routers provide the highest levels of 
functionality at a premium 
majority of small business 
premises do not require 
functionality. The small 
residential market typically 
price, the vast 
and residential 
the premium 
business and 
opt for SoHo 
routers , which provide consumers with the 
desired functionality and an intuitive 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) to simplify the 
configuration process. 
Vendors continually incorporate advanced 
features and technologies into routers making 
them increasingly attractive to consumers. 
Common router features typically include a 
four-port Ethernet switch, high-speed wireless 
networking capabilities, network file sharing, 
printer servers, and scalability for integration 
with smart home technologies within a home 
network. These additional features whilst 
attractive to consumers may also create a 
range of supplementary vulnerabilities. The 
exploited vulnerabilities may have enabled 
cyber criminals to access a private network in 
an unauthorised manner. 
Routers are the "work horses" of the SoHo 
Internet , controlling the flow of data between 
private and public networks. Unfortunately, 
there are ongoing security flaws embedded 
within routers , which may expose users and 
data to intrusions, through a range of attack 
vectors. Cyber criminals who recognise the 
opportunities and benefits in being able to 
control or remotely access routers for personal 
gain can exploit the security flaws within 
routers. For novice end-users, the router is 
often the only barrier segregating the user's 
data from the Internet. Many router 
vulnerabilities stem from poor firmware 
development and a lack of ongoing 
maintenance (Hampton & Szewczyk, 2015). In 
contrast, users also poorly configure routers 
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during the initial configuration stage 
(Szewczyk, 2006). Inadequate security 
configuration may be attributed to end-users 
lacking accurate knowledge and an appropriate 
skillset to apply the ideal security settings. 
Despite end-users typically ridiculed for 
inadequately securing their routers , research 
has demonstrated that vendors are equally to 
blame with poor or inaccurate product 
literature to support and guide end-users 
through the configuration phase (Szewczyk, 
2013). 
2. HISTORY AND 
EVOLUTION OF 
NETWORK ROUTERS 
The foundations of network routing were 
developed in the late 1960s by a closed 
academic group of researchers known as the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). 
The goal of the agency was to build a network 
of four Interface Message Processors (IMPs) to 
send data over phone lines. ARP A put out a 
tender for the development, which was won by 
a small company known as Bolt, Beranek and 
Newman (BBN) (Raytheon, 2011). In August 
1968, the BBN group used "an off-the-shelf 
Honeywell 516 to design the I/ O devices that 
would need to be added to the basic model to 
start writing the code that would reload 
crashed IMPs, pull packets into the machine, 
figure out how to route them, and send them 
on their way" (Raytheon, para.4, 2011). 
On October ist, 1969, the first set of 
characters were successfully transmitted over 
the new network and the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) was 
founded. The IMP could support 50Kbps links 
between nodes (Duffy, 2009). The 
achievements of the group remained confined 
to those at ARP A, BBN and a small group of 
researchers until 1972, when a project titled, 
"The Technology of Packet Switching" was 
presented at the International Conference on 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
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Computer Communication in Washington 
(Raytheon, 2011). 
In 1980, Stanford University was the 
recipient of several Alto workstations and 
Ethernet networking boards from the Xerox 
Palo Alto Research Centre. Collectively, 
Stanford University staff and graduate 
students used this technology to develop what 
later became known as the 'Blue Box.' The 
Blue Box functioned as a multiprocessor, 
providing the capability for Stanford's schools 
and departments to communicate with each 
other. William Yeager, a research engineer at 
Stanford's medical school, had just completed 
writing a small routing program, which acted 
to connect computers in the medical 
department with those in the computer science 
department (Carey, 2001). Yeager's software 
program was a "multiprotocol network that 
linked Alto workstation, mainframes, mini-
computers and printers" (Carey, 2001). Yeager 
went on to writing a more sophisticated 
program, which was able to route several 
protocols including the relatively new Internet 
Protocol (IP). Yeager's advanced software was 
designed for the twenty-four Stanford Blue 
Boxes that could be seen around the campus 
during that time (Carey, 2001). 
In 1985, two Stanford staff members, Len 
Bosack and Sandy Lerner, who had been 
involved in the Blue Box project, allegedly 
asked Yeager for his software code so they 
could modify it to route only Internet 
Protocols. Controversially, in the previous 
year, Bosack and Lerner had founded a 
company called Cisco, and used Yeager's work 
to propel the development of Cisco products. 
This became the subject of legal debate in 
future years (Carey, 2001). Bosack and Lerner 
would later return the capacity for Yeager's 
code to route protocols other than just IP , 
enhancing the functionality of the products 
they developed. Through 1986, Cisco 
introduced its first commercial multiprotocol 
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router, called the Advanced Gateway Server 
(AGS) into the communications market , which 
supported the Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP), Internet Protocol (IP) TCP / IP (Duffy, 
2009). 
IP router architecture has continued to 
evolve m step with the complex and 
sophisticated networks of the protocols they 
support. Today, a SoHo router may "fully 
utilize the capabilities of specialized hardware 
and integrates an endless suite of 
functionalities, ranging from raw packet 
forwarding through traffic shaping, packet 
queuing, access control, Network Address 
Translation (NAT) with connection tracking 
all the way to distributed network protocols" 
(Csaszar, Enyedi, Ridell, Retvari, & Sjodin, 
2012). There was one critical oversight made 
by engineers, developers and researchers who 
actualised the future of our communications. 
The oversight was security, and through its 
absence, forged a mindset of functionality over 
secure communications that persists today. 
3. ROUTERS AS AN 
ATTACK PLATFORM 
The SoHo router is an ideal target for cyber 
criminals. Consumers obtain a router through 
their Internet Service Provider (ISP) or 
purchased online or via a computer retail 
outlet. In either instance, the router typically 
encompasses minimal or no security by default. 
The lack of security reduces the cumbersome 
task of progressing through the configuration 
phase for the novice end-user. However, 
minimal security on the router also simplifies 
the attack process for cyber criminals. A 
successful attack on the router may reward the 
cyber criminal with direct access to the 
router's operating system (firmware) , to the 
prized internal network consisting of all the 
connected devices, and to the data stored and 
traversing the network. As the inclusion of IoT 
and smart devices continues to further increase 
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in quantity within home environments, there 
are additional incentives for cyber criminals 
who exploit the router and network. From 
such a privileged position, the intruder can 
control the network whilst accessing and 
misusing the data stolen from it. The 
consequences for the victim may include loss of 
personal information, financial data, account 
passwords, and their identity. 
Vulnerabilities associated with coding flaws 
in the firmware development stage is an 
ongoing issue. Yang (2016) highlighted this 
issue in a DEFCON presentation in 2015. 
Yang, (2016) discovered a number of zero day 
vulnerabilities in his work as a security 
researcher and ethical hacker on a range of 
SoHo centric routers. Vulnerabilities included 
vendor backdoors, debug interfaces left active, 
concerns with the ease at which intruders 
could gain access to shells, arbitrary file reads, 
stack overflows and unauthorised remote 
access via services such as Universal Plug and 
Play (UPnP) (Yang, 2016). Security researcher 
Pierre Kim publicly disclosed a large quantity 
of zero day vulnerabilities for D-Link routers in 
2017, following numerous failed communication 
attempt to inform D-Link of the security issues 
(Osborne, 2017; Kim, 2017). The reluctance by 
vendors to listen to security researchers and 
the community who discover vulnerabilities 
further demonstrates the issues with 
progressively addressing known security 
vulnerabilities within routers. 
Irrespective of ethics, all system 
penetrations begin with reconnaissance, and 
search engines such as Shodan.io provide a 
perfect opportunity for attackers to identify 
vulnerable targets and gather intelligence. 
Shodan.io purports to be the "world's first 
search engine for Internet connected devices," 
(Shodan.io, 2016) otherwise known as the 
Internet of Things (IoT). Users can access all 
the features of the search engine, which can 
pull information from thousands of different 
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sources. Shodan.io is proving to be a powerful 
tool for identifying vulnerable clients, and to 
demonstrate its capacity a number of search 
queries targeting SoHo connections to 
micro httpd servers were conducted in this 
research. The results were troublesome with 
615,000 SoHo routers identified with open 
ports in response to one search query (port:80 
micro_ httpd). Similar searches were run on 
other popular servers such as Apache (port:80 
Appache httpd) which returned more than 
2,000 vulnerable router hits. Valuable 
information is presented to the user in the 
search results , including the business or 
company name of the target, location, IP 
address, name and model of the router , and 
the ports and services that are open. A 
convenient link is also provided directing the 
user to the router's web interface page where 
default usernames and passwords can be 
tested. If successful, the attacker may proceed 
with a range of attacks as depicted in the 
following section, thus compromising multiple 
hosts. 
4. ATTACKS ON SOHO 
ROUTERS 
4 .1 Cross-Site Request Forgery 
The aim of a Cross-Site Request Forgery 
( CSRF) attack is to direct the user to a web 
page controlled by the attacker where 
malicious code is embedded in web pages. The 
code acts to transfer sensitive data to the 
attacker without the knowledge of the end-
user. Account details, passwords, financial 
information, and other sensitive information is 
stolen in this process. Routers are vulnerable 
to CSRF attacks because they are usually 
configured with through a web browser 
connected to an embedded web server within 
the router. On successful completion of such an 
attack, the router's Domain Name System 
(DNS) entries may be altered or device 
settings altered to make the targeted network 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
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additionally susceptible to attacks (Router 
Check, 2016). Land (2017) discovered that 54% 
of examined routers contained a CSRF specific 
vulnerability. Despite many routers 
encompassing a CSRF vulnerability 
(Rotenberg et al., 2017) , D-Link routers are at 
the forefront of largest quantity of devices 
encompassing the issue (CVE-2015-5999, 2015; 
CVE-2017-5633, 2017; CVE-2017-6411, 2017; 
CVE-2017-7398, 2017) with exploits focusing 
on altering the configuration, or diminishing 
the overall state of security. 
4. 2 InfoITI1ation Disclosure 
Information Disclosure attacks are categorised 
by attempts to acquire specific system 
information through the CPE ( Customer 
Premises Equipment) WAN (Wide Area 
Network) Management Protocol (CWMP). 
Technical support personnel within ISP 
departments leverage CWMP to remotely 
trouble shoot or administer changes to routers. 
In 2015, several Netgear SoHo routers were 
identified as having an information disclosure 
issue that allowed attackers to access 
unauthorised information (Constantin, 2014). 
The vulnerability exploited the Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP) by "sending HTTP 
requests with a blank form and a 
'SOAP Action' header" ( Constantin, 2014). 
Administrator information including the 
model, serial number, and firmware version of 
the router targeted which was available to 
intruders (Constantin, 2014). The CWMP 
service facilitated a variant of the Mirai 
malware specifically exploiting SoHo routers 
and modems (Antonakakis et al. , 2017). The 
extent of the damage caused by the Mirai 
malware targeting German focused routers 
exceeded 900,000 (Kolias, Kambourakis, 
Stavrou & Voas, 2017). 
A directory traversal vulnerability leaves 
users open to intruders attacking SoHo routers 
remotely. A flaw in the firmware allows 
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attackers to access restricted directories, such 
as the router's configuration settings, 
administrator password hashes, ISP usernames 
and passwords, Wi-Fi passwords and client or 
server authentication credentials ( Armasu, 
2015). In 2015, one directory traversal 
vulnerability appearing in the webproc. cgi 
component of the target router allowed an 
attacker to extract a config.xml file containing 
authentication credentials. In this particular 
case, more than 700,000 vulnerable routers 
involving multiple vendors were identified. It 
was later discovered that each vendor had used 
firmware developed by the same third-party 
company (Armasu, 2015). 
4 . 3 CrOE8 Site Scripting 
There are three main cross-site scripting 
attacks, known as 'Document Object Model ' 
(DOM), 'Persistent,' and 'Non-persistent 
attacks.' In each of the attacks, the intruder 
injects malicious JavaScript or HTML code 
into the web application of the router. This 
provides the attacker with elevated privileges 
from which modifications to the firmware 
settings result in a network hijack. The 
attacker needs to be authenticated by the 
router to carry out this attack (Independent 
Security Evaluators & Holcomb, 2013). 
However, once authenticated targeted data 
includes the username and password set up 
page of Network Attached Storage (NAS), the 
device name of the USB advanced.htm or the 
network key to the wireless setup page (NIST, 
2014). 
4.4 Authentication Bypass 
SoHo routers require user authentication to 
access the router's web interface where a 
variety of configuration and function 
modifications occur. Any flaw m the 
authentication method that allows an intruder 
to gain unauthorised access is considered an 
authentication attack. The most basic of these 
attacks involves the use of default username 
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and passwords, which are easily discoverable. 
A number of public websites provide lists of 
vendors ' default username and password 
details. If the owner or administrator of the 
targeted router has failed to change the default 
authentication credentials, then access to the 
router's configuration pages is simplified. An 
alternate and common authentication bypass 
attack is through Structured Query Language 
(SQL) injection technique. An SQL injection 
attack operates by running malicious or altered 
SQL queries against a database or web server. 
A successful SQL injection attack may result 
m unwanted information disclosure, 
compromised data integrity, compromised data 
availability and remote command execution 
(CISCO, 2016). Cutlip (2012) examined the 
Netgear WNDR3700 series broadband wireless 
routers , documenting the presence of a 
vulnerability within the miniDLNA server 
making the router susceptible to SQL injection, 
yielding remote root-level access. Alternate 
vendors are not immune to the vulnerability 
with D-Link encompassing numerous 
Authentication Bypass issues through an SQL-
Injection vulnerability as per CVE-2013-5945 
(CVE-2013-5945, 2013; EDB-ID: 30062, 2013). 
UPnP vulnerabilities (SSDP discovery and 
SOAP) to the Internet side of the device 
Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) is a protocol 
standard that allows communications between 
computers and network-enabled devices. The 
protocol is enabled by default on millions of 
systems, including routers where 
authentication is rarely implemented. The 
literature suggests this feature is one of the 
most exploitable services available to an 
attacker. The issues stem from poor 
development and implementation of the 
protocol, with much of the literature pointing 
to a vast number of systemic security issues. 
UPnP enabled routers allow devices and 
applications on the network supporting it to 
configure themselves and perform port 
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forwarding functions without authentication 
(Router, 2016). 
4 . 5 Unencrypted Password 
Storage 
In 2013, research conducted by RAPID7 
identified forty to fifty million networked 
enabled devices that were vulnerable to 
exploits using the UPnP protocol. Nearly all 
the vulnerable devices identified were SoHo 
routers. Critically, "sixty percent of routers 
tested allowed users to login to their 
administrative console using passwords sent 
wirelessly via HTTP - clear text broadcasts 
over the air: Only 40 percent of the routers 
tested provided HTTPS connections and only 
20 percent used it by default" (Fogarty, 2014). 
This is an unacceptable risk. End-users are 
exposed to Man in the Middle attacks (MITM) 
where network traffic is intercepted and 
directed to the attacker who is primed to 
capture these details and use them to further 
compromise systems. According to Fogarty, 
(2014) the danger is critical if unsecured 
wireless services are used, such as those found 
in public places, small businesses and closely 
packed living environments (Fogarty, 2014). 
This is due to signal leak whereby the presence 
of wireless access signals are detectable beyond 
the boundaries of where it is required. 
4 . 6 Unauthenticated Hardware 
Linking 
According to Holcomb (2013) , the Netgear 
WNDR7400 router was found to be vulnerable 
to an attack which is carried out by sending 
HTTP requests to the router's web 
management application. The process causes 
the routers internal and external storage to 
link to an attacker controlled Ready Shared 
Cloud Account, which facilitates access to files 
hosted by Ready Shared enabled routers. 
Ready Share Cloud is a feature provided by 
Netgear that allows the consumer to access 
remotely a USB storage device that is 
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connected to a USB port on the router 
(Netgear, 2011). A successful attack will 
provide the intruder with access to all files 
stored on the external storage of the SoHo 
router (Independent Security Evaluators & 
Holcomb, 2013). 
Remote attackers may modify firewall rules 
or access private media files using Digital 
Living Network Alliance (DLNA) DLNA is an 
industry wide standard that allows data to be 
shared over a home network. It includes 
organisations and vendors who comply with 
the standard to allow music, movies and other 
data shared across televisions, smartphones, 
computers and other devices. Many routers are 
able to link DLNA compliant products across 
home networks with the exception of Apple 
TV, which is currently not supported 
(Laughlin, n.d.). DLNA uses UPnP for media 
management, discovery and device control 
which simplifies the set up and use of device 
streaming across the home network ( Charan, 
2012). The more devices connected to the 
network the greater the opportunities for 
attackers to target UPnP vulnerabilities. 
4. 7 Buffer Overflows 
Buffer overflows are a critical security 
vulnerability that occurs because of 
programming errors affecting memory. These 
can occur in any operating system. The 
consequence of a buffer overflow is that 
attackers can inject malicious code into the 
buffer and if the code executes; the attacker 
can take control of the system. A recent buffer 
overflow vulnerability was identified in several 
D-Link router models, reported to the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
on 25 August 2016. In this case a "stack-based 
buffer overflow in dws/ api/ Login allowed 
remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via 
a long session cookie" (CVE-2016-5681, 2016). 
4. 8 Rerr1.ote Adrriinistration 
Enabled 
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Remote administration allows the user and 
anyone else with credentials to access the 
administration page of the user's router over 
the Internet from an external location. In order 
to remotely access a router, the IP address, 
port number and administrative username and 
password is entered into a web interface. Users 
should disable this feature unless there is a 
genuine need to access the router remotely. 
This is because enabling remote access is akin 
to running an open port, which is an attractive 
target to an attacker. 
According to Constantin (2014), many 
ISPs are deploying SoHo routers to their 
customers with remote access enabled, allowing 
the vendor to remotely manage and update 
devices. CWMP is used to troubleshoot 
technical problems remotely ( Constantin, 
2014). It is estimated that in 2011, 147 million 
devices had the CWMP protocol enabled, of 
which seventy percent were SoHo routers. The 
remote management protocol typically operates 
on port 7547 and is the second most commonly 
encountered service port after port 80 
(Constantin, 2014). 
5. CHALLENGES IN 
SECURING SOHO 
ROUTERS 
The myriad of vulnerabilities identified in the 
preceding section provides insight into the 
challenges facing governments, cyber security 
professionals, vendors, businesses and 
consumers in securing SoHo routers. Yang 
(2016) suggests that the practice of 
customising open source software to suit a 
specific router m combination with 
programmers lacking sufficient knowledge of 
programming languages is a significant issue in 
developing reliable, bug-free code. Yang's view 
is supported through the reverse engineering of 
firmware, which demonstrated that some 
routers were encompassing security 
vulnerabilities exceeding ten years in age 
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(Hampton & Szewczyk, 2015). Yang (2016) 
describes the practice of poor firmware 
development as leading to the production of a 
range of coding flaws, which are primed for 
exploitation. Fogarty (2014) argues that 
wireless routers are riddled with security holes 
stemming from design goals that focus 
usability over security. Given that vendors are 
often praised with being first to the market 
with innovation, 
security is an 
overlooked. 
it is not surprising that 
aspect that is typically 
Routers purchased in-store typically have 
security features disabled by default and 
backdoors left open. Consumers purchasing 
ADSL SoHo routers in-store cannot assume the 
device was shipped with security pre-
configured. Furthermore, unlike a traditional 
operating system, the end-user is not prompted 
to update the device during the initial 
configuration process. The literature highlights 
a persistent mindset of functionality over 
security. According to Sericon Technology 
(2015), router software issues extend to 
vendors, failing to fix problems when identified 
coupled with users failing to upgrade firmware 
even when a fix may have been made available 
for a considerable timeframe. The disconnect 
between vendors and end-users creates a risk 
focused environment with routers 
encompassing little security and well 
documented vulnerabilities circulating in the 
'hacking' community. 
According to Horowitz (2016), numerous 
issues exist when attempting to update router 
firmware. These include but not limited to: 
updates modifying router settings that the 
consumer is unaware of, complicated processes 
with poor documentation, methods to update 
firmware varying and too often requiring 
manual effort, firmware update processes 
'bricking' or making the router non-functional, 
and a lack of notification of the availability 
and importance of an update for consumers. 
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Poor firmware update processes are further 
extenuated through vendors using 'features' as 
a driver to promote firmware updates rather 
than security issues being addresses. Unless an 
end-user understands a benefit in an advanced 
feature set, the likelihood of the update being 
applied is diminished. 
Programmers may create undocumented 
backdoors during the firmware development 
phase, so they can interact with products 
during the development phase. The 
programmer may wish to save data and test 
and/ or modify the program when things go 
wrong (Haag, Cummings, & Rea 2016). 
Programmers may opt to close backdoors 
before the device is released to the public but 
may also forget to do so, or purposely leave 
one or two open, so they can access the 
program post sale. This practice exposes all 
routers supporting the firmware to attack and 
consequently all the clients associated with it 
(Haag et al. , 2016). 
The United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (US-CERT), the Independent 
Security Evaluators (ISE), and several security 
professionals all highlight concerns about ISPs 
deploying pre-configured routers. The 
consensus appears to be that too often, routers 
are deployed with limited security, and 
consumers do not have the knowledge, interest, 
or willingness to dedicate the time required to 
alter pre-configured settings (US-CERT, 2011). 
Researchers in Spain (Folgado, Rodriguez, & 
Sanz de Castro, 2017) examined twenty-two 
models of SoHo routers from different vendors, 
most of which were deployed by ISPs. The 
researchers found sixty flaws across the 
twenty-two models tested. This further 
supports concerns that ISPs do not support 
end-users in pursuing a cyber security 
conscious mindset. 
Vendors and ISPs provide limited 
information to consumers to assist them in 
securing SoHo routers. Szewczyk & Valli 
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(2009) described the absence of consumer 
support and poorly written documentation as a 
significant risk. They were particularly critical 
of the quality of vendors' user manuals, citing 
a lack of detail, inadequate instruction, the use 
continual use of unexplained jargon and a lack 
of consistency in content as being major 
barriers to consumers having neither the 
confidence nor encouragement to implement 
adequate security. Szewczyk & Valli (2009) 
conducted an examination of vendor 
documentation over a four-year period and 
concluded not a single vendor manual could be 
described as 'ideal' or adequately support a 
novice end-user in applying ideal security 
practices to their router. "Attempting to 
configure and secure an ADSL router is not 
designed to be a trivial task for the average 
end-user" (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009). This 
statement raises the question about who 
should be responsible for provisioning adequate 
security. End-users need protection, but also 
require the set-up of networks to be sufficiently 
simple to allow them to participate in and 
understand the set-up process. However, if a 
router is secured by default, and thus 
potentially cumbersome to implement in a 
home network - would this process potentially 
encourage end-users to purchase an alternate 
product with less security but improved 
usability. 
According to Independent Security 
Evaluators (ISE) , (2015) , SoHo routers are 
continually vulnerable due to the manner in 
which they are deployed and used in locations 
such as; coffee shops, libraries, small businesses 
and high density living communities where 
signals can bleed through walls and someone 
could 'listen in'. The ISE report concluded that 
compromised routers could be used to perform 
a man in the middle attack and thus enabling 
a more sophisticated attack to be performed on 
devices connected to the router. Specific 
threats may include but are not limited to 
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network sniffing, traffic rerouting, DNS 
poisoning, denial-of-service attacks, or 
impersonating servers (Independent Security 
Evaluators, 2015). 
6. ISP EJVlERGING 
ROUTER 
DEPLOYlVIENT 
Throughout many countries around the world, 
ISPs have committed to creating large scale 
ISP influenced consumer provisioned public 
Wi-Fi networks. Companies such as Fon in 
Europe, Comcast in America, and Telstra in 
Australia are examples of companies that have 
established this shift in our public network 
environments. Each scheme works through the 
co-operation between the ISP and their 
consumers. ISPs deploy routers to their 
consumers that are pre-configured to allow the 
consumer to 'trade-off' a portion of their home 
Internet bandwidth to make it publicly 
available for others to use. 
Essentially, the ISP provides the 
connection to the Internet and the consumer 
extends the ISP's network by turning their 
SoHo network into a Wi-Fi hotspot. The 
benefit to the participating consumer is that 
their 'trade-off' is effectively offset by their 
ability to use 'hotspots' provided by other 
consumers who have similarly opted into the 
program. The commonality amongst users is 
they share the same ISP provider and in 
Australia, opt-in to the service (Telstra 
Corporation Limited [AU], 2016). As part of 
their launch, Telstra extended its Telstra Air 
free service period to customers until 27 March 
2017, and currently boasts 650 thousand 
hotspots across Australia (Telstra Corporation 
Limited [AU], 2016b). According to Kidman 
(2014), Telstra anticipates creating 
approximately 2 million hotspots nationwide. 
Additional benefits for Telstra customers 
include free access to 19 million hotspots 
internationally, through Telstra's partnership 
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with European Company, Fon (Telstra 
Corporation Limited [AU], 2016b). 
The routers deployed by Telstra for the 
'Air' network are named Telstra Gateway and 
Gateway Max. Each device supports Hybrid 
Fibre Coaxial (HFC), ADSL, VDSL and NBN 
and cost $168.00 AUD for the 'Telstra 
Gateway' and $264.00 AUD for the 'Gateway 
Max.' Consumers can purchase the Air 
compatible routers outright or pay through a 
subscription agreement. Alternatively, 
consumers can purchase a day pass for 
occasional use. The service requires use of the 
Telstra Air application, which is compatible 
with iOS and Android devices . The customer 
must log in to the application using a 
username and password, which ensures all data 
used is deducted from the guest user's private 
broadband account . The application will search 
for and automatically connect the customer's 
mobile computing device to the nearest 
hotspot when detected, thereby providing 
customers with an extended public Wi-Fi 
service (Telstra Corporation Limited (AU) , 
2016a) . 
Technical security information about the 
Telstra Air network and associated hardware is 
presently scarce. The Air network does make 
use of two SSIDs, one for the public network 
and one for the private network and can 
operate on either the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz 
frequencies. A scan of the local area during this 
research identified two public prefixes, namely 
Fon Wi-Fi and Telstra-Air. Telstra allows 
customers to change the network names, as 
long as the public side of the network 
encompasses a prefix identifying it as an Air 
service. 
Instructions on setting up the Telstra 
ADSL gateway is presented on the Telstra 
website step-by-step with graphical images to 
assist customer comprehension. However, no 
information is provided with respect to the 
configuration of default security settings. 
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Telstra does state that ''your Wi-Fi name and 
password can be found on the fridge magnet 
you received with your gateway" (Telstra 
Corporation Limited [AU], 2016b). This is an 
obvious security concern and it is 
recommended that ISPs avoid providing the 
names and corresponding security keys of 
customer networks on products that consumers 
are likely to keep within 'public' areas of their 
homes. Fortunately, Telstra does provide 
information on how customers can change 
these details and manage other ADSL settings 
through the management console. Telstra also 
appears committed to ensuring firmware 
updates on all devices to remain current, 
maintaining a policy of updating firmware 
automatically through their remote 
management system. The security trade-off of 
remote management is perhaps a considered 
risk adopted by them and it is hoped that 
mitigation strategies against remote 
management attacks have been implemented. 
Security and other advice is offered to 
Telstra customers through their crowd support 
and the knowledge base community services. 
Telstra (2016) is cautious enough to inform 
customers to be careful with Telstra Air 
communications, advising communications 
between the Wireless Access Point (WAP) 
( ADSL router) and device remains 
unencrypted and therefore the service is not 
recommended for sensitive communications 
such as banking. 
"Most public Wi-Fi networks, including 
Telstra Air, are unencrypted or open and 
potentially unsafe. When you're connecting to 
an open network, check for the padlock icon in 
the address bar of your device 's web browser. 
This represents another layer of security. We 
recommend not using Telstra Air, or any 
public Wi-Fi network, for things like Internet 
banking or sending and receiving sensitive 
materials. Information for families Public Wi-
Fi , including Telstra Air, is available in many 
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places across Australia and is easy to access" 
(Telstra Corporation Limited [AU], 2016.) 
According to Kidman (2014), Telstra has 
always intended to deploy 'normal Wi-Fi' 
security on the public side of the network and 
if Telstra's partner Fon, can be used as a 
template to explore security features of Telstra 
Air products, it may be inferred that the 
default encryption standard is Wi-Fi Protected 
Access 2 (WPA2). Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP), WP A and a no encryption option, 
often called 'open' are also supported. Fon 
devices support three encryption protocols 
namely, Temporal Key Integrity Protocol 
(TKIP), Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES), and TKIP / AES (mixed mode) 
(Gustafsson & Thor, 2007). Further research is 
required if default and optional setting 
configurations provided by Telstra are to be 
fully understood and in the best interest of 
consumers. 
In America, Comcast provides the same or 
similar expanded Wi-Fi service through its 
'XFINITY' hotspot feature. Like Fon and 
Telstra Air, Comcast describes their service to 
consumers as an extended Wi-Fi network, 
"Your XFINITY Wireless Gateway broadcasts 
an additional "xfinitywifi" network signal for 
use with XFINITY WiFi. This creates an 
extension of the XFINITY WiFi network right 
in your home that any XFINITY Internet 
subscriber can use to sign in and connect. This 
XFINITY WiFi service is completely separate 
from your secure WiFi home network" 
(Hoffman, 2014a). 
Proponents of this consumer extended Wi-
Fi network argue that consumers are provided 
with greater safeguards when compared to 
open public Wi-Fi networks because users 
must register and opt-in to use the service, 
with all Internet activity linked to the guest's 
private user account. Critics point to the ease 
in which false accounts or rogue hotspots can 
be created, along with fake sign-in pages, 
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effectively creating a vacuum from which all 
sorts of sensitive data can be stolen. 
Consumer-oriented man-in-the-middle devices 
such as "Wi-Fi Pineapples" are exemplars of 
devices that could be used to impersonate and 
intercept traffic within these networks ( Acuna 
et al., 2017). 
In considering these arguments, it is 
proposed that opt-in services such as Telstra 
Air, Fon, and Xfinity provide no greater levels 
of security to users of public Wi-Fi services 
when compared to traditional open Wi-Fi 
hotspots. Network traffic on 'Air' remains 
unencrypted and no mitigation strategies are 
proposed to protect users from accessing rogue 
access points. For the provider of the extended 
service, little risk is apparent, as guest users sit 
on the outer side of a separate network and all 
guest activity is logged and associated back to 
the guest's private broadband account. For the 
consumer provider's private network, there 
appears to be no change to the vulnerability 
status beyond that which exists as a regular 
end-user of Internet services. The private 
network remains as secure as the configuration 
of their SoHo router is. 
7. CONSUJVIER LEGAL 
RISKS 
The legal issues regarding the Internet and 
Internet-related services are complex and the 
following presentation of material is designed 
to promote discussions about these issues. 
Consumer liability hereafter is defined as the 
burden of responsibility imposed on an adult 
person to secure a Wi-Fi router owned or 
operated by him or her. The test will be 
whether a burden exists or may exist in 
Australia in future years. Watkins (2013) 
argues that although criminal liability for the 
malicious actions of a third party accessing an 
unsecure wireless network remain largely 
ambiguous, cases have emerged whereby 
unlikely individuals are being held accountable 
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for the "negligent operation of a wireless 
network." The pre-eminent case regarding 
consumer liability and the provision of public 
Wi-Fi networks took place in Germany in 
2010. The case, 'Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony 
Music Entertainment Germany GmbH' (2010) 
has been well documented in several media 
publications and law journals in Europe and 
elsewhere. The case centred on a small music 
store business that provided free Wi-Fi access 
to its customers, some of whom used the 
service to illegally download songs owned by 
Sony Music Entertainment (Grieshaber, 2010). 
'Sony' sought to sue Tobias McFadden, the 
owner of the store, for indirectly breaching 
copyright laws; by failing to prevent the use of 
his public Wi-Fi service for illegal 
downloading. The German court made three 
significant rulings in this case, 
1. "Internet users need to secure their 
private wireless connections by 
password to prevent unauthorized 
people from using their web access to 
illegally download data" (Grieshaber, 
2010). 
2. "Internet users can be fined up to euro 
100 if a third party takes advantage of 
their unprotected WLAN connection to 
illegally download music or other files , 
the Karlsruhe-based court said in its 
verdict" (Grieshaber, 2010). 
3. The court did not find the provider of 
the service, Tobias McFadden liable for 
the criminal conduct, namely the 
downloading of songs (Grieshaber, 
2010). 
In Australia at present, individuals and 
businesses are not required by law to secure 
SoHo routers, whether for private or extended 
for public use, and therefore are not currently 
legally liable for activity conducted by a third 
party using it. However, to date, Australia has 
not been challenged in the same way as seen in 
the 'McFadden,' 'Sony' case, where breaches of 
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copyright occurred through individuals 
accessing a third-party Wi-Fi service. More 
recently, and despite the German court ruling 
that passwords were required to secure private 
networks, the German Government has 
proposed new legislation designed to reduce the 
burden of responsibility on business owners 
and individuals providing public Wi-Fi 
networks. The proposed legislation is to reflect 
the German Government's position that 
individuals and businesses are not liable for 
illegal activity arising from Internet activity 
they provide, as long as the service is only 
made available to users, "who have declared 
not to commit any rights violations in the 
context of the use" (Out-Law.com, 2016). The 
Australian Government may need begin 
considering a similar approach in order to 
protect Australian citizens who might be 
unknowingly but similarly exposed to litigation 
by large corporations imposing their copyright 
protections. It is unclear whether the absence 
of a requirement to secure Wi-Fi services is 
sufficient to ward off these litigation attempts. 
Placing the onus of responsibility on 
consumers alone to adequately secure their 
SoHo router is unreasonable, especially in the 
absence of adequate instruction, adequate set-
up and configuration documentation, or any 
legal requirement for developers, vendors or 
ISPs to meet minimal security standards. If a 
minimum standard of security is the desired 
outcome, then the onus of responsibility should 
be on developers, vendors, and ISP providers 
who possess both the technical knowledge and 
expertise to deploy devices that could comply 
with set minimum-security standards. In 
support of this assertion, a recent settlement 
between ASUSTeK (ASUS) and the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is reviewed. 
On 23 February 2016, the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) entered into a 
settlement with ASUSTeK (ASUS) after it was 
alleged that ASUS had failed to use 
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'reasonable security' to protect consumers' 
personal information that was exposed in a 
security breach in February 2014. A total of 
12,900 consumers' storage devices containing 
personal data were exposed in the breach 
( Charfoos, Feld, & Kadish, 2016). ASUS had 
previously claimed that their routers "protect 
consumers from any unauthorized access, 
hacking, and virus attacks" and "protect [the] 
local network against attacks from hackers" 
(Charfoos et al. , 2016). Upon review, the 
routers were shown to have several 
vulnerabilities in the firmware due to design 
flaws and were inadequately secured. 
Allegations that ASUS had also failed to notify 
customers about how to mitigate the risks once 
identified also formed part of the original 
complaint (Charfoos et al. , 2016). The terms of 
the settlement are comprehensive, with the 
main outcomes including a requirement for 
ASUS to introduce a comprehensive security 
plan to ensure routers produced by them 
"protects the privacy, security, confidentiality, 
and integrity of information transmitted 
through the routers" (Charfoos et al., 2016). In 
addition, ASUS will be subjected to audits for 
the next 20 years (Charfoos et al., 2016). 
8.FUTURE 
RECOJVIJVIENDA TIO NS 
Several recommendations are made m 
accordance with the outcomes of this research. 
A discussion is encouraged between policy 
makers, ISPs, and vendors about the 
introduction of legislation that places a burden 
of responsibility on vendors, developers and 
ISP providers to meet minimum-security 
standards when selling or deploying SoHo 
routers in Australia. It is suggested that at a 
minimum standard should include: 
Security to be at the forefront of all 
firmware development, with increased 
testing and transparency of all 
firmware placed into the public domain. 
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SoHo routers not to be deployed or sold 
with default administrative usernames 
and passwords. This could theoretically 
minimise the exploitation of devices, 
which are accessed using simplistic 
brute-force approaches encompassing 
common usernames and passwords. 
Removing weak or obsolete Wi-Fi 
security protocols that are known to be 
easily exploitable and incorporating 
WPA2/ AES security protocols as 
standard. 
SoHo routers to be deployed or sold 
with remote administration disabled or 
if enabled, clearly documented that it is 
enabled (i.e. informing the end-user), 
specifying why it is enabled, the 
benefits and risks towards the consumer 
of it being enabled and how it can be 
disabled. 
Improved methods for providing and 
applying firmware updates, and 
consistent standards for vulnerability 
disclosures and notifications to be 
developed. 
Minimum standards for content in user 
manuals to be established. The 
standard should clearly document what 
information must be included in the 
user manual, and standardised 
terminology that is easily understood 
by the end-user agreed upon by ISPs 
and vendors. 
A significant increase in consumer 
education and training programs 
regarding SoHo router security, risks 
and mitigation strategies, and cyber 
security in general. 
SoHo router security is influenced through 
both technological and human factor 
challenges. For a lengthy period, end-users 
have had the opportunity to control and 
influence the state of security implemented and 
used on routers. However, preceding research 
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suggests that end-users do not always apply 
optimum security practices on their router. 
Furthermore, vendors do not necessarily 
deploy updates or address security 
vulnerabilities 
Subsequently, 
within a 
the 
timely manner. 
aforementioned 
recommendations enable routers to make use of 
baseline security standards thus minimising 
common and simple threats from targeting 
routers , for instance bandwidth theft resulting 
from open or WEP based wireless networks. 
End-users can be continually encouraged and 
influenced to make security conscious decision, 
but history has demonstrated that convenience 
will always be at the forefront of how 
consumers utilise technology. Convenience, 
coupled with end-users lacking an 
understanding, will persistently result in non-
ideal practices being employed on routers. By 
creating a secure standardised baseline, end-
users are not given the opportunity to diminish 
the state of security and thus forced to 
conform to a minimal level of implemented 
security. 
9. CONCLUSION 
It is evident that SoHo routers were not 
designed by vendors with security at the 
forefront of their development. In contrast 
routers have undergone a rapid expansion of 
add on features, with usability and 
functionality prioritised over security. The 
consequences of this approach are easily 
recognised with numerous vulnerabilities 
embedded in the firmware exposing hundreds 
of thousands, if not millions of consumers 
around the world to attacks on a continual 
basis. Search engines such as Shodan.io have 
capitalised on publicly exposed weaknesses of 
IoT devices. Strategic searches are easily used 
to obtain detailed information about devices, 
which may serve in assisting attackers to 
identify and select vulnerable targets . As large 
corporations move even further into creating 
worlds conditioned by our online behaviours, 
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collecting information about what consumers 
do, where they go and why they do it , even 
more of our lives will be exposed. ISPs are 
expanding the geography of our connections. 
Consumers are opting into ISP provisioned 
services that engulf them in a web of public 
hotspots they help to create. In Australia, 
there is currently minimal publicly accessible 
information on the security features enabled 
upon deployment of ADSL routers used by 
consumers to contribute to this expanded Wi-
Fi service. On the surface, it appears there are 
advantages for the consumer knowing that all 
guest connections are logged against the 
guests' private account; however, no 
information or discussion is available that 
either describes or discusses mitigation 
strategies to offset the risk of users joining 
rogue hotspots. 
To mitigate the ongoing and prevalent 
issues identified m this paper, both 
technological and human factors must be 
altered to accommodate the novice end-users -
who make up a significant proportion of end-
users in Australia. From a technological 
perspective, security must be enforced, rather 
than be optional. Router vendors are at the 
fundamental level to support good security 
practices. For instance, the option for an end-
user to utilise the default authentication 
credentials, during the initial configuration 
process of the device, should not be restricted. 
The selection of adequate passwords should be 
enforced and enhanced through password 
meters to demonstrate visually the soundness 
of a password by today's standards. 
Consumers must begin to understand the 
risks involved in online environments and take 
a legitimate interest in their security. While it 
is unreasonable to transfer any technical 
burden for securing devices, which are 
inherently insecure onto consumers, they must 
recognise the burden of risk they carry. 
Consumers and policy makers must demand 
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responsible action; they must insist that 
security is at the forefront of all firmware 
development. Governments and policy makers 
must begin to enforce minimum-security 
standards. These should outline the minimum-
security features that are to be enabled on 
upon the deployment of all ADSL SoHo 
routers to the general population. 
Unfortunately, too many consumers are at risk 
because the window to their networks ( and 
their lives) is wide open, and sadly, many 
consumers are misinformed with how easily 
accessible they truly are. 
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